Foreign versus domestic institutional investors in emerging markets: Who contributes more to firm-specific information flow?  by Kim, Jeong-Bon & Yi, Cheong H.
China Journal of Accounting Research 8 (2015) 1–23HO ST E D  BY Contents lists available at ScienceDirectChina Journal of Accounting Research
journal homepage: www.elsevier .com/locate /c jarForeign versus domestic institutional investors
in emerging markets: Who contributes more
to ﬁrm-speciﬁc information ﬂow?http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cjar.2015.01.001
1755-3091/ 2015 Sun Yat-sen University. Production and hosting by B.V.
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
⇑ Corresponding author. Tel.: +852 3442 8043; fax: +852 3442 0347.
E-mail address: cheongyi@cityu.edu.hk (C.H. Yi).Jeong-Bon Kim, Cheong H. Yi ⇑
Department of Accountancy, City University of Hong Kong, Hong KongA R T I C L E I N F O
Article history:
Received 12 December 2014
Accepted 30 December 2014
Available online 23 January 2015
Keywords:
Foreign investors
Institutional trading
Investment horizon
Stock price synchronicity
KoreaA B S T R A C T
Using a large sample of ﬁrms listed on the Korea Stock Exchange over 1998–
2007, this study investigates whether and how trading by foreign and domestic
institutional investors improves the extent to which ﬁrm-speciﬁc information is
incorporated into stock prices, captured by stock price synchronicity. We ﬁnd,
ﬁrst, that stock price synchronicity decreases signiﬁcantly with the intensity of
trading by foreign investors and domestic institutional investors. Second,
trading by foreign investors facilitates the incorporation of ﬁrm-speciﬁc infor-
mation into stock prices to a greater extent than trading by aggregate domestic
institutions. Third, among domestic institutions with diﬀering investment
horizons, short-term investing institutions, such as securities and investment
trust companies, play a more important role in incorporating ﬁrm-speciﬁc
information into stock prices via their trading activities, compared with
long-term investing institutions, such as banks and insurance companies.
Finally, we provide evidence suggesting that trading by foreign and domestic
short-term institutions reduces the extent of accrual mispricing. Our results
are robust to a variety of sensitivity checks.
 2015 Sun Yat-sen University. Production and hosting by B.V.
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creati-
vecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
The past 25 years have witnessed a growing trend in which many emerging countries have liberalized their
stock markets, allowing foreign investors to invest directly in the equity securities of local ﬁrms. Foreign access
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choice and performance. An important stream of research in the “home bias” literature investigates ﬁrm-spe-
ciﬁc factors that inﬂuence shareholdings by foreign investors. Although barriers to international investment in
emerging markets have signiﬁcantly reduced since market liberalizations, foreign investors may still face indi-
rect barriers (Karolyi and Stulz, 2003). The home bias literature typically posits the information disadvantage
of foreign investors, which inﬂuences their asset holdings and performance. For example, Kang and Stulz
(1997) and Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001), using Japanese and Swedish data, respectively, ﬁnd that foreign
investors hold disproportionately more shares of large ﬁrms and ﬁrms with greater recognition or visibility in
international markets. Bradshaw et al. (2004) ﬁnd that U.S. investors prefer foreign ﬁrms that exhibit higher
levels of conformity with U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles. Covrig et al. (2006) ﬁnd that foreign
managers of mutual funds tend to overweight stocks that are globally well known, while domestic managers
prefer stocks with large dividend payouts, low ﬁnancial distress and high growth potential. Similarly, Leuz
et al. (2009) provide evidence that U.S. investors are reluctant to invest in foreign ﬁrms with aggressive earn-
ings management, especially those from countries with poor disclosure regimes. Overall, these studies suggest
that foreigners prefer to invest in stocks with less information uncertainty to overcome their information
disadvantages.
Another stream of research focuses on the investment performance of foreign investors vis-a`-vis domestic
investors and provides mixed evidence. For example, Shukla and Inwegen (1995), Brennan and Cao (1997)
and Hau (2001) ﬁnd evidence that local investors outperform foreign investors. In contrast, Seasholes
(2004), Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000), Karolyi (2002) and Froot and Ramadorai (2008) provide evidence
suggesting that foreign investors are more informed and outperform their domestic counterparts. In reconcil-
ing the mixed evidence on investor performance, Albuquerque et al. (2009) show the presence of global private
information that gives an information advantage to international investors who are not as informed as local
investors about local private information.
Since the aforementioned studies focus mainly on foreign investors’ asset holdings and investment perfor-
mance, little is known about the role of foreign and domestic institutional investors in inﬂuencing the infor-
mation environment, particularly in emerging markets with less developed institutional infrastructures. To ﬁll
this gap, our study aims to provide systematic evidence on the following under-researched questions:
(1) Does trading by foreign and domestic institutional investors improve the ﬂow of ﬁrm-speciﬁc informa-
tion to the market?
(2) Do foreign investors play a more signiﬁcant role in enhancing ﬁrm-speciﬁc information ﬂow via their
trading than domestic institutional investors?
(3) Does the informational role of domestic institutions diﬀer according to their investment horizons?
To address these questions, we ﬁrst investigate whether the trading of a ﬁrm’s shares by foreign and local
institutional investors improves ﬁrm-speciﬁc information ﬂow to the market, particularly the extent to which
ﬁrm-speciﬁc information is incorporated into stock prices relative to common (market-wide and/or industry-
wide) information. In so doing, we measure the relative amount of ﬁrm-speciﬁc versus common information
incorporated into stock prices, using stock price synchronicity, or co-movement. Lower stock price synchro-
nicity means that stock prices covary with ﬁrm-speciﬁc factors to a greater extent than with common factors,
leading to less synchronous or more informative stock prices (Durnev et al., 2003; Jin and Myers, 2006). To
the extent that institutional investors, whether foreign or local, actively collect, process and trade on ﬁrm-spe-
ciﬁc information, we expect that their trading activities facilitate the incorporation of ﬁrm-speciﬁc information
into stock prices, thereby reducing synchronicity.
Second, we examine whether and how foreign investors diﬀer from domestic institutional investors in their
roles of inﬂuencing the ﬂow of ﬁrm-speciﬁc information to the market. Given that foreign investors in emerg-
ing markets are typically more sophisticated and have an information advantage of global information, it is
interesting to examine whether or not our results on the informational eﬀect of trading by foreign investors are
driven by the fact that foreign investors are institutional investors. We evaluate this unexplored question by
comparing the informational role of foreign trading with that of domestic institutional trading, using the latter
as a benchmark.
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able to facilitate ﬁrm-speciﬁc information ﬂow, compared with domestic institutions with relatively long
investment horizons. Previous research ﬁnds that the inﬂuence of institutional trading on managerial behavior
and stock returns diﬀers signiﬁcantly, according to whether institutional investors are dedicated or transient
institutions (Bushee, 1998, 2001) and whether they are short-term investors—who trade more actively—or
long-term investors—who trade less actively (Yan and Zhang, 2009). To date, however, little is known about
whether institutions with diﬀering investment horizons play diﬀerent roles in inﬂuencing the incorporation of
ﬁrm-speciﬁc information into stock prices. To provide systematic evidence on this issue, we compare the infor-
mational role of domestic short-term institutions, such as securities and investment trust companies, with that
of domestic long-term institutions, such as banks and insurance companies.
To assess the ﬁrm-level relation between the amount of ﬁrm-speciﬁc information incorporated into stock
prices and the trading activities of foreign versus domestic institutional investors, we need to obtain ﬁrm-level
data on trading by foreign and domestic institutional investors in a speciﬁc market. This paper takes advan-
tage of the availability of such data in Korea. To our knowledge, Korea is one of few countries, if not the only
one, in which detailed data on the shareholdings and trading of equity shares by foreigners and diﬀerent types
of domestic institutions are publicly available for listed companies. Foreigners investing in equity shares listed
on the Korea Stock Exchange (KSE) are required to register with the Financial Supervisory Service (FSS).
Since 1992, the FSS has kept track of the number of equity shares held by foreign investors and diﬀerent types
of domestic institutions for each stock listed on the KSE.1 This data availability provides us with a unique
setting in which to compare the informational role of foreign investors with that of domestic institutions
and allows us to further evaluate any diﬀerences between the informational roles of domestic institutions with
diﬀerent investment horizons. In this regard, the Korean equity market is well suited to address our research
questions. The Korean regulatory authority completely abolished limits on foreign equity ownership in 1998
(a year after the Korean ﬁnancial crisis started). We analyze the informational role of foreign and domestic
institutional investors in the Korean stock markets for the period 1998–2007, during which foreign ownership
constraints were not binding. By limiting our sample to the post-crisis period, we eﬀectively control for the
potential eﬀect of foreign ownership constraints, or “investability,” on our results.2
Brieﬂy, our results reveal the following: First, we document evidence that both foreign and domestic insti-
tutional investors play a signiﬁcant role in facilitating the incorporation of ﬁrm-speciﬁc information into stock
prices. Our regression results show that both types of investors contribute to reducing stock price synchronic-
ity, or co-movement, via their trading activities. Second, we ﬁnd that the informativeness-enhancing eﬀect of
foreign trading is signiﬁcantly greater than the same eﬀect associated with aggregate domestic institutional
trading. This suggests that foreign investors are more actively involved in information-based trading and their
trading activities accelerate the ﬂow of ﬁrm-speciﬁc information into the market.
Third, we ﬁnd that, among domestic institutions, securities and investment trust companies play a more
signiﬁcant role in facilitating the ﬂow of ﬁrm-speciﬁc information to the market via their trading, compared
with banks and insurance companies. Given that these securities and investment trust companies engage more
actively in informed trading for short-term proﬁts than banks and insurance companies, our results are1 Foreigners can hold Korean stocks by directly trading them or via indirect trades through foreign institutions. Therefore, there are two
types of foreign investors in Korea: (i) foreign individuals who reside in and outside of Korea and (ii) branches/subsidiaries of foreign
institutions domiciled in Korea and foreign institutions domiciled outside Korea. While the database we use, KIS-DATA of the Korea
Investment Service (KIS), provides information about the aggregate numbers of shares held by “foreign investors” and diﬀerent types of
domestic institutions (i.e., securities companies, investment trust companies, banks, and insurance companies), it does not provide
information about the decomposition of shareholdings by diﬀerent types of foreign investors. However, our discussions with several FSS
and KIS oﬃcials indicate, without exception, that foreign investors in Korea consist predominantly of foreign institutions. The percentage
of shares traded by foreign individual investors participating directly in the Korean equity market is trivial during our sample period and
thus the term foreign investors in the KIS database can be interpreted as foreign institutional investors. In this paper, the terms foreigners,
foreign institutional investors and foreign institutions are therefore used interchangeably to refer to foreign investors.
2 As is common in emerging markets, the foreign ownership limit diﬀers across stocks within a country and across countries. Using an
international sample of ﬁrms from 33 emerging market countries, Bae et al. (2004) show that the degree to which a stock can be owned by
foreigners (or investability) is positively associated with return volatility. Further, Bae et al. (2012) ﬁnd that greater investability is
associated with the more eﬃcient transmission of global market information into stock prices in emerging markets.
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speciﬁc information ﬂow to the market to a greater extent than those with relatively long investment horizons.
Finally, we provide evidence that accrual mispricing is mitigated for ﬁrms whose shares are actively traded by
foreign investors and domestic short-term institutions, suggesting that foreign and domestic short-term insti-
tutional trading enhances the information environment of local ﬁrms. Overall, our results support the view
that foreign investors and domestic short-term institutions engage more actively in information-based trading
and thus play a more important role in facilitating the incorporation of ﬁrm-speciﬁc information into stock
prices, compared with domestic long-term institutions.
This paper adds to the existing literature in the following ways. First, while many studies in the home bias
literature examine foreign investors’ preferences over stock characteristics and their trading patterns (e.g.,
Kang and Stulz, 1997; Choe et al., 1999; Ahearne et al., 2004; Covrig et al., 2006), they pay little attention
to the impact of trading on the information environment in emerging markets. To our knowledge, our study
is the ﬁrst to investigate the impact of foreign trading on the information environment and compare it with
that of domestic institutional trading.
Second, prior research suggests that institutional trading is an important channel through which ﬁrm-spe-
ciﬁc information is incorporated into stock prices (e.g., Chakravarty, 2001; Hartzell and Starks, 2003;
Piotroski and Roulstone, 2004; Aslan et al., 2007; Ferreira and Laux, 2007). Piotroski and Roulstone
(2004) show that ﬁrm-speciﬁc return variation (an inverse measure of synchronicity) is positively associated
with trading by institutional investors. Ferreira and Laux (2007) provide evidence that institutional trading
contributes more to the incorporation of private information into the stock prices of ﬁrms with greater open-
ness to takeovers. Our study extends the results of Piotroski and Roulstone (2004) and Ferreira and Laux
(2007) by oﬀering a ﬁner decomposition of institutional investors. We decompose institutional investors into
foreign and domestic institutions and further classify domestic institutions into short-term and long-term
investors based on the type of institution. Our analysis contributes to the related literature by adding new
evidence that trading by foreign investors and domestic short-term institutions decreases stock price synchro-
nicity or increases the amount of ﬁrm-speciﬁc information incorporated into stock prices, but trading by
domestic long-term institutions does not.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops our hypotheses. Section 3 explains the measurement of
our research variables and speciﬁes our main regression model. Section 4 describes the sample and data
sources. Section 5 presents empirical results, including descriptive statistics and our main regression results.
Section 6 presents empirical results using an alternative measure of ﬁrm-speciﬁc information ﬂows. Section 7
conducts further analysis to examine the informational role of foreign and domestic institutional trading in the
context of accrual pricing. The ﬁnal section presents our conclusions.
2. Hypothesis development
Stock market liberalization in emerging markets facilitates the ﬂow of investment funds from capital-abun-
dant, developed countries to capital-scarce, developing countries. Using aggregate country-level data, several
studies in the international ﬁnance literature show that this enhanced ﬂow of foreign funds to domestic equity
markets contributes to increasing domestic equity market values (Bekaert and Harvey, 2000), reducing the
cost of raising equity capital (Stulz, 1999), boosting domestic investments (Henry, 2000) and enhancing ﬁnan-
cial market development and liquidity (Bekaert et al., 2005). This study argues that a country’s stock market
liberalization leads to an improvement in the information environment. Increased foreign access to domestic
equity markets stimulates more research and information production by local and foreign analysts, brokerages
and other market participants. It also spurs local ﬁrms to disclose more and better information. For example,
local ﬁrms are prompted to set up an investor relations department to eﬀectively cope with the ever-increasing
demand for detailed information from foreign investors and to provide detailed ﬁnancial information in
foreign languages.33 Since LG Electronics ﬁrst established its investor relations department in 1994, many ﬁrms followed suit. Firms increasingly use
voluntary disclosure to improve investor relations by communicating directly with investors. In 2007, Korean publicly traded ﬁrms, on
average, made 1.82 times the number of voluntary disclosures annually (Korea Listed Companies Association).
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standards, disclosure rules and corporate governance practices that are comparable to international standards.
Since opening its equity markets to foreign investors in 1992, the Korean government has made steady eﬀorts
to improve corporate transparency. Speciﬁcally, after the 1997 Asian ﬁnancial crisis, the Korea Financial
Supervisory Commission made substantial amendments to the Korean ﬁnancial accounting standards to be
more compatible with International Financial Reporting Standards, enhanced auditor independence with
the introduction of class action lawsuits and improved corporate governance practices by strengthening
minority shareholder rights and external monitoring mechanisms.4
In addition to its impact on a country’s overall information environment, foreigner access to local equity
markets also inﬂuences the information environment at the ﬁrm level. Foreign investors in emerging markets
are typically sophisticated institutional investors, such as mutual funds and pension funds. In general, insti-
tutional investors, whether foreign or domestic, have more resources and expertise than individual investors.
Institutional investors enjoy economies of scale in information acquisition and processing due to relatively low
per-unit costs of acquiring and analyzing information, and are better at gleaning insights from public infor-
mation such as published annual reports. Such investors can thus be considered what Kim and Verrecchia
(1994) call “elite information processors.” Their superior information is ultimately incorporated into stock
prices via trading. In a related vein, Kim and Verrecchia (1994, 1997) present a scenario under which the
low-frequency public release of information, such as earnings announcements, triggers agents with diverse
information processing skills to generate new idiosyncratic insights from the public disclosure.5 Consistent
with these arguments, several studies show that institutional investors are better informed, on average, and
trade actively to exploit their information advantage (e.g., Chakravarty, 2001; Hartzell and Starks, 2003;
Piotroski and Roulstone, 2004; Aslan et al., 2007; Ferreira and Laux, 2007). Thus, to the extent that institu-
tions’ buying and selling decisions are guided by the ﬁrm-speciﬁc information they gather and analyze, we
expect that the trading activities of institutional investors, whether foreign or domestic, facilitate the price for-
mation process by promoting the incorporation of ﬁrm-speciﬁc information into stock prices, which in turn
reduces stock price synchronicity. To provide direct evidence on the issue, we test the following hypothesis
in alternative form:
H1. Stock price synchronicity decreases with the intensity of trading by foreign and domestic institutional
investors.
When it comes to the relative information advantage of foreign versus domestic institutional investors, the
empirical evidence to date is mixed. Shukla and Inwegen (1995) and Hau (2001) ﬁnd that domestic investors
have an information advantage over foreign investors. In contrast, Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000) and
Karolyi (2002) show that foreign investors outperform domestic institutional investors in Finland and Japan,
respectively. Seasholes (2004) provides evidence suggesting that foreign investors in Taiwan are better
informed than domestic institutions.
On one hand, foreign investors may have a disadvantage in gaining access to private information that cor-
porate insiders have, relative to domestic institutional investors, for the following reasons. Foreign investors
investing in Korean stocks may have an information disadvantage due to distance, language and culture. In
Korea, corporate governance is relatively weak, corporate ownership is highly concentrated in the hands of a
few controlling shareholders or founding family members, ﬁrms’ aﬃliations with large business groups are pre-
valent, internal transactions among related parties are common and value-relevant (inside) information is often
shared exclusively within the closely held network of related parties, including corporate insiders, aﬃliated or
subsidiary ﬁrms within the same business group, substantial shareholders, main creditors, major customers
and input suppliers (Jacobson and Aaker, 1993; Jiang andKim, 2004; Joh, 2003; Kim and Yi, 2006). In this envi-
ronment, domestic institutional investors are more likely to have informal channels through which they can
communicate with insiders (e.g., CEO, board members and controlling shareholders), compared with foreign
investors. As a result, foreign investors are likely to be informationally disadvantaged in local markets,4 For example, as part of post-crisis governance reforms, Korean listed companies are now required to have independent, non-executive
directors on the board and to establish an audit committee under the board.
5 Barron et al. (2002) ﬁnd that public accounting disclosures trigger the production of signiﬁcant idiosyncratic information.
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overcome this disadvantage. This information problem may discourage informed trading by foreign investors
and potentially impede the incorporation of ﬁrm-speciﬁc information into stock prices (e.g., Grossman and
Stiglitz, 1980; Roll, 1988; Morck et al., 2000), which in turn leads to less informative stock prices.
On the other hand, foreign investors may be better informed. Foreign investors in emerging markets are
part of global investment companies who hold foreign stocks from multiple countries in their portfolios
and rebalance their portfolios when new information arrives. Some of them are also located in world ﬁnancial
centers such as New York and London, which enables them quick access to better information and provides
them with better learning opportunities through the transfer of information, skills and ideas. For example,
Christoﬀersen and Sarkissian (2009) provide evidence that U.S. mutual funds located in ﬁnancial centers per-
form better than other funds located elsewhere because managers of funds in ﬁnancial centers can have better
learning opportunities, which leads to performance improvements. These investors with global portfolios of
equity shares are more likely to have a better understanding of, and the superior ability to collect and analyze,
global business and investment factors (e.g., oil price trends and foreign currency ﬂuctuations) that simulta-
neously inﬂuence the stock prices of multiple ﬁrms in many countries around the world. In particular, the Kor-
ean economy has a relatively high exposure to global business factors as its dependence on overseas demand
for Korean products and overseas supply of non-labor inputs has been growing year after year.6 As a result,
the Korean economy is susceptible to external global shocks, such as oil price changes or currency movements.
In fact, foreign investors may not only have better access to global information, they may also process global
data and convert it into private information. To the extent that foreign investors have information about these
business factors inﬂuencing the future prospects of Korean companies, we expect that foreign investors may
have a relative information advantage over local institutions in Korea.
Given the two opposing perspectives on the relative information advantage of foreign investors vis-a`-vis
domestic institutional investors, it is an empirical question whether there are any diﬀerences in the informa-
tional roles that foreign and domestic institutional investors play in emerging markets. To provide direct evi-
dence on this under-researched issue, we test the following hypothesis in alternative form.
H2. Trading by foreign investors decreases stock price synchronicity to a greater extent than trading by
domestic institutions.There are three diﬀerent types of domestic institutional investors in Korea: (1) securities (or investment bro-
kerage) and investment trust companies, including investment advisory companies; (2) insurance companies;
and (3) banks, including short-term and long-term lending institutions. In general, institutions act as agents
for other investors. They are thus constrained by various legal restrictions, such as the prudent-man laws, that
purport to protect small individual investors. Among institutions, banks and insurance companies are subject
to more stringent prudence standards, aﬀecting their investment patterns and horizons (Del Guercio, 1996). In
addition, when it comes to investing in equity shares, Korean banks and insurance companies are subject to
the investment limits imposed under the Banking Act and Insurance Business Act, respectively, whereas no
such regulations restrict securities and investment trust companies. Further, banks and insurance companies
are more likely to have business relations with the local companies in which they invest, compared with secu-
rities and investment trust companies (Gillian and Starks, 2003; Aggarwal et al., 2011).7 As a result, domestic
banks and insurance companies hold shares of other companies primarily for the purposes of maintaining
business relations and/or long-term investment purposes, and thus are less likely to trade shares for short-term
proﬁts,8 while domestic securities and investment trust companies are more likely to engage actively in infor-6 According to the Bank of Korea, exports accounted for 55% of the nation’s gross national income in 2008, which is well above Japan’s
22% and the U.S.’s 18.5%.
7 As an example, Samsung Life Insurance can manage the pension funds of many Korean listed companies and provide them with a
company-wide group life insurance policy.
8 In Korea, banks and insurance companies hold a large proportion of the voting rights of a ﬁrm to maintain their relationships or
aﬃliations with the ﬁrm as a client or business partner. As such, their equity stakes can be viewed, in large part, as the holding of debt
(Baek et al., 2004). Del Guercio (1996) provides evidence that institutional investors governed by prudent-man laws (e.g., pension funds
and insurance companies) tend to hold stocks with certain characteristics for longer,
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domestic institutions, securities and investment trust companies play a more important role in facilitating
the incorporation of ﬁrm-speciﬁc information into stock prices via their trading activities.
Given the scarcity of evidence on this issue, particularly in the context of an emerging market, we aim to
provide systematic evidence on whether the informational roles of diﬀerent domestic institutions diﬀer accord-
ing to their investment horizons. For this purpose, we hypothesize the following in alternative form:
H3. Trading by domestic institutions with short investment horizons decreases stock price synchronicity to a
greater extent than trading by domestic institutions with long investment horizons.3. Measurement of variables and model speciﬁcation
3.1. Stock price synchronicity
A key dependent variable in our study is stock price synchronicity, which captures the extent to which indi-
vidual stock returns co-move with common factors. The total variation of a ﬁrm’s stock return can be decom-
posed into two components: (1) common return variation, that is, the return volatility associated with
common (market-wide and industry-wide) factors, and (2) ﬁrm-speciﬁc return variation, that is the return vol-
atility associated with ﬁrm-speciﬁc factors. Similar to other studies (e.g., Morck et al., 2000; Jin and Myers,
2006; Gul et al., 2010), we measure stock price synchronicity using the R2 statistics from an augmented market
model. Speciﬁcally, we estimate the following model using weekly return data for each stock:9 Inrj;k;t ¼ aj þ bj1rm;t þ bj2ðrus;t þ ej;tÞ þ bj3;rk;t þ ejt ð1Þwhere rj;k;t is the return on ﬁrm j in industry k at week t; rm;t is the Korea market index return at week t; rus;t is
the U.S. market index return at week t; ej;t is the change in the exchange rate per U.S. dollar at week t; and rk;t
is the value-weighted weekly return of industry k at week t, which is computed using all ﬁrms with the same
two-digit code of the Korean Standard Industry Classiﬁcation (KSIC), with ﬁrm j’s weekly return excluded.
Stocks are included in our sample if more than 40 weeks of data are available during a particular year. Eq. (1)
includes U.S. stock market returns to control for the global market factor.9
Let r2j and r
2
je denote the total return variation and ﬁrm-speciﬁc return variation, respectively, of Eq. (1).
Common return variation is then measured by r2j  r2je. For each ﬁrm in the sample, we compute the relative
common return variation for each stock using the ratio of common return variation to total return variation,
that is, ðr2j  r2jeÞ=r2j . Note here that R2j of Eq. (1) is equal to this ratio, while 1 R2j of Eq. (1) is equal to
r2je=r
2
j . We then obtain our measure of stock price synchronicity, denoted by Synch, for ﬁrm j in each year asSynchj ¼ log
rj  rje
rje
 
¼ log R
2
j
1 R2j
 !
ð2ÞThe logarithmic transformation is applied to circumvent the bounded nature of R2j within [0,1]. By construc-
tion, high values of Synch mean a higher level of common return variation relative to ﬁrm-speciﬁc return
variation.
3.2. Empirical model
To examine the eﬀect of trading by foreign versus domestic institutional investors on stock price synchro-
nicity, we estimate the following regression model:Eq. (1), the expression rus,t + ej,t translates U.S. market returns into local currency units.
10 To
activit
(IBES)
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8 J.-B. Kim, C.H. Yi /China Journal of Accounting Research 8 (2015) 1–23Synchjt ¼ b0 þ b1FORV jt þ b2DOMV jt þ b3 log ð1þ#ANALÞjt þ b4 logMVEjt þ b5LEV jt þ b6MBjt
þ b7SROAjt þ b8HERFINjt þ b9CHAEBOLjt þ b10GDRjt þ b11BIG4jt þ b12AveVoljt
þ ðIndustryDummiesÞ þ ðYearDummiesÞ þ error ð3Þwhere empirical deﬁnitions of all variables are provided in the Appendix and the dependent variable, Synch,
for ﬁrm j and year t, is as deﬁned in Eq. (2). Our proxy for the intensity of foreign trading, FORV, is the total
number of shares purchased and sold by foreign investors as a fraction of the annual trading volume. Our
proxy for the intensity of trading by domestic institutional investors, DOMV, is the total number of shares
purchased and sold by diﬀerent domestic investing institutions (i.e., securities and investment trust companies,
banks, and insurance companies) as a fraction of the annual trading volume.
As control variables, we include ﬁrm-level variables that are deemed to inﬂuence Synch. Previous research
shows that stock price synchronicity is positively related to the intensity of analyst activity in the U.S. market
(Piotroski and Roulstone, 2004; Hameed et al., 2010), in emerging markets (Chan and Hameed, 2006) and
around the world (Kim and Shi, 2010). We include the log-transformed measure of the number of analysts
issuing earnings forecasts, that is, log(1 + #ANAL), to control for this eﬀect of analyst activity on Synch.10
We include market capitalization (logMVE), leverage (LEV) and the market-to-book ratio (MB) to control
for the potential impacts of ﬁrm size, ﬁnancial risk and growth potential, respectively, on Synch. Evidence
shows that synchronicity is also inversely related to earnings volatility (e.g., Piotroski and Roulstone, 2004;
Kim and Shi, 2010). We include earnings volatility, SROA, to control for the eﬀect of this negative relation
on our results, where SROA is measured by the standard deviation of return on assets (ROA) over the past
ﬁve years using 10 half-year earnings observations. It is likely that ﬁrm performance is more interdependent
among ﬁrms within a concentrated industry. In such a case, information that is speciﬁc to a ﬁrm is more likely
to have valuation implications to other ﬁrms in the same industry. This can result in a higher level of intra-
industry information transfer, which can lead to more synchronous stock prices (Piotroski and Roulstone,
2004). To control for this possibility, we include industry concentration (HERFIN), which is measured by
the sales revenue-based Herﬁndahl index of industry-level concentration, where the industry is deﬁned by
its two-digit KSIC code.
Chaebols (large business groups or conglomerates) play a dominant role in the Korean economy. Prior to
the Korean ﬁnancial crisis in 1997, a top-30 chaebol controlled, on average, 26 ﬁrms in a variety of industries
(Kim and Yi, 2006). Like other business groups in emerging markets, Korean chaebols can be viewed as a
collection of diverse business enterprises in a wide range of industries, typically controlled by members of a
founding family. Similar to keiretsu in Japan, the top-30 chaebols are highly diversiﬁed business groups with
a nexus of explicit and implicit contracts that closely tie aﬃliated ﬁrms to one another, and often share value-
relevant inside information exclusively with aﬃliated ﬁrms. Compared with independent ﬁrms, ﬁrms aﬃliated
with large business groups in emerging markets may aﬀord their controlling shareholders more opportunities
for internal transactions through intra-group trading and internal ﬁnancial markets for their private gains
(Hubbard and Palia, 1999; Khanna and Palepu, 2000; Joh, 2003). This would provide chaebol-aﬃliated ﬁrms
with more opportunities and means for managerial opportunism relative to independent ﬁrms. Consistent
with the above argument, Kim and Yi (2006) ﬁnd that chaebol-aﬃliated ﬁrms in Korea engage more aggres-
sively in opportunistic earnings management compared with standalone ﬁrms. We include an indicator vari-
able, CHAEBOL, to control for the potential eﬀect of chaebol membership on the ﬂow of ﬁrm-speciﬁc
information to the market.
Fernandes and Ferreira (2008) document that cross-listing leads to a decrease in stock price synchronicity,
particularly for ﬁrms in developed markets. We include an indicator variable representing the presence of
cross-listing in overseas stock markets, denoted by GDR, to control for the eﬀect of cross-listing on our results.further examine whether foreign analysts’ activities inﬂuence stock price synchronicity similar to foreign institutional trading
ies, we deﬁne domestic analysts as ones forecasting earnings only for Korean ﬁrms in the Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System
database. Using this deﬁnition, in lieu of log(1 + #ANAL), we separate analyst coverage into foreign coverage (log(1 + #For-
AL)) and domestic coverage (log(1 + #DomesticANAL)) and estimate Eq. (4). We ﬁnd that domestic coverage is positively related
k price synchronicity, while foreign coverage is insigniﬁcantly related.
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the U.S. (e.g., Reed et al., 2000), in East Asian countries (e.g., Mitton, 2002; Fan and Wong, 2005) and around
the world (Choi and Wong, 2007; Choi et al., 2008). Large auditors, such as international Big 4 audit ﬁrms, are
more likely to limit managerial discretion over opportunistic earnings management and thus help improve the
credibility of published ﬁnancial statements, which may, in turn, facilitate the ﬂow of more credible, ﬁrm-spe-
ciﬁc information to the market. However, in Korea, their eﬀect on synchronicity may be limited, because Big
4-aﬃliated auditors in Korea only have a member ﬁrm relationship with large local audit ﬁrms, and are not
allowed to run their own operations in Korea. We include an indicator variable, BIG4, to control for audit
quality diﬀerentiation between Big 4-aﬃliated and non-Big 4-aﬃliated auditors. We also include the average
daily trading volume (AveVol) to control for the eﬀect of liquidity. Industry dummies are included to control
for industry ﬁxed eﬀects.4. Sample and data
4.1. Foreign equity ownership in Korea
In 1992, foreigners were allowed for the ﬁrst time to own equity shares of Korean ﬁrms. As summarized in
Table 1, the ownership limit for foreign investors has increased since 1992, reﬂecting the Korean government’s
policy of gradually liberalizing Korean stock markets to the global investment community. The ownership
limits for each individual foreign investor were 3% of a ﬁrm’s shares outstanding in 1992, 4% in April
1996, 5% in October 1996, 6% in May 1997, 7% in November 1997, and 50% in December 1997—the starting
month of the Korean ﬁnancial crisis—and were completely lifted in May 1998. In addition to an individual
ownership limit, the FSS imposed a limit for foreign investors as a group. In 1992, this aggregate ownership
limit was 10%, meaning that foreigners as a group could own only up to 10% of the equity shares outstanding
of a Korean ﬁrm listed on the KSE. The aggregate limit was increased to 12% in December 1994 and then
gradually increased to 26% by November 1997. During the starting month of the Korean ﬁnancial crisis,
the aggregate limit increased to 55% and was completely lifted in May 1998.
Table 2 presents summary statistics of foreign equity ownership in Korea by year for the period 1992–2007.
The second column of Table 2 provides the total number of shares (in millions of shares) owned by foreign
investors. The numbers in parentheses represent the percentage of shares owned by foreign investors relative
to total shares outstanding. This equally weighted measure of foreign ownership increased gradually from
4.1% in 1992 to 11.5% in 1996. It then decreased to 9.1% in 1997, reﬂecting an outﬂow of foreign equity invest-
ment during the Korean ﬁnancial crisis. The post-crisis period, during which the foreign ownership limit was
completely lifted, witnessed a stable increase in foreign ownership, from 10.5% in 1998 to a peak of 22.9% in
2005. The last column of Table 2 reports the market value (in billions of Korean won) of shares owned byTable 1
Changes in shareholding limits for each foreign individual and foreigners as a
group (as a percentage of the total number of shares outstanding). Source: FSS.
Individual limit (%) Aggregate limit (%)
January 1992 3 10
December 1994 3 12
July 1995 3 15
April 1996 4 18
October 1996 5 20
May 1997 6 23
November 1997 7 26
December 1997 50 55
May 1998 No ceiling No ceiling
The individual limit represents the percentage of equity shares each individual
foreigner is allowed to hold. The aggregate limit represents the percentage of
equity shares that foreigners as a group are allowed to hold.
Table 2
Number and market value of shares held by foreign investors in each sample year. Source: FSS.
Year Number of shares held by foreign investors (millions of
shares), as a percentage relative to the total number of shares
Market value of shares held by foreigners (billions of Korean
won), as a percentage relative to total market capitalization
1992 220.2 n/a
(4.1%)
1993 503.0 n/a
(8.7%)
1994 634.8 15,402
(9.2%) (10.2%)
1995 762.3 16,723
(10%) (11.9%)
1996 989.2 15,222
(11.5%) (13%)
1997 819.8 10,358
(9.1%) (14.6%)
1998 1204.1 25,633
(10.5%) (18.6%)
1999 2136.8 76,590
(12.3%) (21.9%)
2000 2731.1 56,558
(13.9%) (30.1%)
2001 2869.2 93,698
(14.7%) (36.6%)
2002 3054.5 93,160
(11.5%) (36.0%)
2003 4259.1 142,534
(18%) (40.1%)
2004 5514.1 173,158
(22%) (41.9%)
2005 5334.9 260,262
(22.9%) (39.7%)
2006 5563.1 262,533
(22.2%) (37.2%)
2007 5347.9 308,180
(18.9%) (32.3%)
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capitalization of all ﬁrms listed on the KSE. This value-weighted measure of foreign ownership is greater than
the equally weighted measure across all years and the diﬀerence between the two measures has increased over
years since the 1997 crisis. This diﬀerence indicates that foreign investors hold disproportionately more shares
of large ﬁrms in their portfolios, a characteristic that became increasingly pronounced during the post-crisis
period of 1998–2007.4.2. Sample construction
Our sample construction begins with the list of non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms included in the 2007 KIS-DATA ﬁle
compiled by the Korea Investment Service, a subsidiary of Moody’s Investment Service.11 The KIS-DATA
ﬁle includes ﬁnancial statement data and ownership-related data, including the number of shares held by
foreign investors, domestic institutions by type (i.e., securities and investment trust companies, banks, and
insurance companies) and the largest shareholder for all ﬁrms listed on the KSE. All stock return data are
gathered from Data stream and trading volume data are obtained directly from the KSE. The number of
analysts following a ﬁrm is obtained from the IBES International Summary. We exclude ﬁrms in regulated11 Kang and Stulz (1997) exclude ﬁrms in the ﬁnancial service industry from their Japanese sample.
Table 3
Distribution of sample ﬁrms by year.
Year Number of ﬁrms Percentage
1998 434 9.63
1999 437 9.69
2000 399 8.85
2001 427 9.47
2002 405 8.98
2003 512 11.36
2004 443 9.83
2005 442 9.80
2006 489 10.85
2007 520 11.54
Total 4508 100
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ticular year.12
Our ﬁnal sample consists of 4508 ﬁrm–year observations for the 10-year post-crisis period of 1998–2007,
during which the foreign ownership limit was completely lifted. Restricting our sample to the post-crisis obser-
vations allows us to eﬀectively control for the potential eﬀect of the foreign ownership constraint on our
results. We winsorize all continuous variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles to mitigate the eﬀects of extreme
observations. Table 3 provides the number of ﬁrms included in our sample and their percentage relative to
total ﬁrm–year observations by year.
5. Empirical results
5.1. Descriptive statistics
Table 4 presents the distributional properties of our research variables. The R2 statistics refer to the coef-
ﬁcient of determination for Eq. (1), while Synch is our log-transformed measure of stock price synchronicity in
Eq. (2). As shown in Panel A of Table 4, the mean and median R2 are 0.266 and 0.245, respectively. The mean
R2 of 0.266 is greater than the reported mean R2 of 0.193 for the U.S. sample of Piotroski and Roulstone
(2004), though it is lower than the reported mean R2 of 0.454 for the Chinese sample of Gul et al. (2010), sug-
gesting that the stock prices of Korean ﬁrms are more (less) synchronous than those of U.S. (Chinese) ﬁrms.
Panel B of Table 4 provides descriptive statistics for the PIN measures that are inversely related to Synch. The
PINmeasure appears to be reasonably distributed, with a mean (median) of 0.215 (0.213) and a standard devi-
ation of 1.175.
Panel C of Table 4 presents the distributional properties of FORV,DOMV and two components of DOMV,
that is, STDV and LTDV, where DOMV = STDV + LTDV. These four trading intensity measures represent
the total number of shares traded (i.e., purchased and sold) per year by foreign investors, domestic institu-
tions, domestic short-term institutions (i.e., securities and investment trust companies) and domestic long-term
institutions (i.e., bank and insurance companies), respectively, as a fraction of the annual trading volume.13
As shown in Panel C of Table 4, the distributions of these trading measures appear to be skewed, and foreign
investors and domestic institutions, on average, traded about 10% and nearly 19%, respectively, of total shares
outstanding. Consistent with our expectations, both the mean and median values of STDV are greater than
those of LTDV, suggesting that domestic short-term institutions trade more intensely than domestic long-term
institutions.12 Several ﬁrms in regulated industries (e.g., utilities and telecommunications) are subject to other types of regulatory limits of foreign
ownership, even after 1998. These companies are excluded from our sample.
13 We also run our analyses using the log-transformed measures of FORV, DOMV, STDV and LTDV. The results (unreported) are
qualitatively similar.
Table 4
Descriptive statistics.
Q1 Mean Median Q3 Std. dev. N
Panel A: Stock price synchronicity
R2 0.129 0.266 0.245 0.386 0.170 4508
Synch 1.904 1.297 1.124 0.463 1.175 4508
Panel B: Probability of informed trading measure
PIN 0.185 0.215 0.213 0.246 0.054 2933
Panel C: Variables of interest used in main regressions
FORV 0.003 0.103 0.020 0.101 0.191 4508
DOMV 0.015 0.188 0.092 0.308 0.220 4508
STDV 0.007 0.126 0.050 0.201 0.163 4508
LTDV 0.006 0.061 0.031 0.097 0.073 4508
Panel D: Control variables
log(1 + #ANAL) 0.000 0.656 0.000 1.100 0.779 4508
logMVE 16.940 18.089 17.786 18.956 1.643 4508
LEV 0.348 0.492 0.493 0.634 0.195 4508
MB 0.346 0.898 0.594 1.060 0.949 4508
SROA 0.022 0.048 0.035 0.055 0.048 4508
HERFIN 0.017 0.064 0.023 0.096 0.069 4508
CHAEBOL 0.000 0.221 0.000 0.000 0.415 4508
GDR 0.000 0.036 0.000 0.000 0.187 4508
BIG4 0.000 0.479 0.000 1.000 0.499 4508
AveVol 0.004 0.012 0.009 0.020 0.063 4508
All variables are deﬁned in Appendix B.
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other control variables used in simultaneous estimations. In general, our sample ﬁrms display considerable
cross-sectional variation in log(1 + #ANAL), LEV, MB, SROA and HERFIN as reﬂected in the large
standard deviations relative to their mean values. Descriptive statistics for our size variable (logMVE) suggest
that it is reasonably distributed, though its cross-sectional variation is not large relative to other variables. On
average, about 22% of our sample ﬁrms are aﬃliated with chaebols, while 3.6% of our sample ﬁrms are cross-
listed on overseas stock markets via Global Depository Receipts (GDRs). On average, only about 48% of our
sample ﬁrms have their ﬁnancial statements audited by Big 4-aﬃliated audit ﬁrms. Given that about 85% of
U.S. ﬁrms are audited by Big 4 auditors (e.g., Kim et al., 2003), the evidence in Table 4 indicates that Big 4-
aﬃliated auditors in Korea have a much smaller market share in the Korean audit market than in the U.S.
market.
5.2. Results of main regressions
Table 5 presents the results of our main regression in Eq. (3). Throughout the paper, all reported t-values
for the estimated coeﬃcients are on an adjusted basis using standard errors corrected for ﬁrm and year clus-
tering.14 As shown in column 1 of Table 5, we ﬁnd that the coeﬃcient of the intensity of foreign trading,
FORV, is signiﬁcantly negative at the 1% level, suggesting that stock price synchronicity decreases signiﬁcantly
with the intensity of foreign trading. As shown in column 2 of Table 5, when we add the intensity of domestic
institutional trading to that of foreign trading, we ﬁnd that both the coeﬃcients of FORV and DOMV are
signiﬁcantly negative at the 1% and 10% levels, respectively (0.513 with t = 2.94 and 0.225 with
t = 1.94, respectively). This is consistent with H1, suggesting that institutional trading, whether foreign or
domestic, accelerates the incorporation of ﬁrm-speciﬁc information into stock prices, thereby reducing stock
price synchronicity.14 See Petersen (2009) for a detailed discussion about the use of clustered standard errors as a means to correct residual correlations in
panel data.
Table 5
Eﬀect of foreign and domestic institutional trading on stock price synchronicity.
Variable Dependent variable = Synch
(1) (2) (3)
Coeﬀ. t-Stat. Coeﬀ. t-Stat. Coeﬀ. t-Stat.
FORV 0.559 3.14a 0.513 2.94a 0.558 2.95a
DOMV 0.225 1.94c
STDV 0.836 2.17b
LTDV 0.159 0.26
log(1 + #ANAL) 0.135 2.40b 0.142 2.48b 0.144 2.48b
logMVE 0.170 3.87a 0.184 4.25a 0.181 4.23a
LEV 0.014 0.12 0.010 0.35 0.009 0.35
MB 0.000 0.06 0.000 0.02 0.000 0.01
SROA 0.916 2.80a 0.931 2.85a 0.927 2.82a
HERFIN 0.006 0.10 0.024 0.17 0.016 0.16
CHAEBOL 0.263 4.77a 0.265 4.81a 0.261 4.78a
GDR 0.158 1.67c 0.138 1.56 0.153 1.62
BIG4 0.079 2.38b 0.079 2.40b 0.080 2.39b
AveVol 0.753 1.15 1.098 1.32 1.073 1.29
Intercept 4.667 5.94a 4.868 6.26a 4.833 6.22a
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.248 0.249 0.249
N 4508 4508 4508
The superscripts a, b and c denote the 1%, 5% and 10% levels of signiﬁcance, respectively, using a two-tailed test. All variables are deﬁned
in Appendix B. Reported t-values are on an adjusted basis using standard errors corrected for clustering by ﬁrm and by year.
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short-term institutions such as securities and investment trust companies that have a relatively short invest-
ment horizon, STDV, and (ii) trading by long-term institutions such as banks and insurance companies that
have a relatively long investment horizon, LTDV. We then include these two proxies in lieu of DOMV in our
regression. This decomposition allows us to evaluate whether investment horizons diﬀerentially inﬂuence the
informational role of domestic institutions. We ﬁnd that the coeﬃcient of STDV is signiﬁcant at the 5% level
with an expected negative sign, while the coeﬃcient of LTDV is negative but insigniﬁcant at any conventional
level. The above results are consistent with H2, suggesting that domestic short-term institutions play a more
important role in facilitating the incorporation of ﬁrm-speciﬁc information into prices via their trading activ-
ities, compared with domestic long-term institutions. The above ﬁnding is consistent with that of Yan and
Zhang (2009), who ﬁnd that in the U.S. market, short-term institutions are better informed than long-term
institutions.
Turning back to the results in column 2 of Table 5, we ﬁnd that, while the coeﬃcients for both FORV and
DOMV are signiﬁcantly negative, the coeﬃcient of FORV is signiﬁcantly greater in its absolute magnitude
than the coeﬃcient of DOMV (p = 0.05, one-tailed test). This ﬁnding is consistent with H3, suggesting that
the Synch-reducing eﬀect of foreign trading observed is not driven by the fact that foreign investors are insti-
tutional investors. Rather, the results are consistent with the view that foreign investors are better informed
and more actively involved in informed trading than domestic institutions. Stated another way, foreign inves-
tors have superior ability to collect and process ﬁrm-speciﬁc information than domestic institutions, and tend
to trade more intensely on it. As a result, trading by foreign investors accelerates ﬁrm-speciﬁc information cap-
italization into stock prices in a more accurate and timely manner, compared with trading by domestic
institutions.
As shown in column 3 of Table 5, however, when we decompose domestic investing institutions into
securities and investment trust companies (with a relatively short investment horizon) and non-securities com-
panies such as banks and insurance companies (with a relatively long investment horizon), we ﬁnd that the
coeﬃcients of both FORV and STDV are signiﬁcant with an expected negative sign at the 1% and 5% levels,
respectively, while the coeﬃcient of LTDV is insigniﬁcant at any conventional level. This result suggests that
14 J.-B. Kim, C.H. Yi /China Journal of Accounting Research 8 (2015) 1–23the synchronicity-reducing eﬀect of domestic institutional trading observed in column 2 of Table 5 is driven, in
large part, by trading by domestic short-term institutions, and not by domestic long-term institutions. We also
ﬁnd that the coeﬃcient of STDV is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent in magnitude from that of FORV (p = 0.18, one-
tailed test), suggesting that both foreign investors and domestic short-term institutions facilitate ﬁrm-speciﬁc
information ﬂow to the market to a similar degree. In short, the results reported in Table 5, taken together,
indicate that both foreign investors and domestic short-term institutions contribute more to the incorporation
of ﬁrm-speciﬁc information into stock prices via their trading activities than domestic long-term institutions.
With respect to the estimated coeﬃcients of control variables, the following is apparent. First, the coeﬃ-
cient of log(1 + #ANAL) is signiﬁcantly positive at the 5% level across all columns of Table 5, indicating that
synchronicity increases with analyst following. This is in line with the ﬁnding of previous research, that stock
prices become more synchronous as analyst activities become more intense in the U.S. market (Piotroski and
Roulstone, 2004; Hameed et al., 2010), in emerging markets (Chan and Hameed, 2006) and around the world
(Fernandes and Ferreira, 2008; Kim and Shi, 2010), because analysts engage primarily in the production and
dissemination of common (industry-wide and/or market-wide) information, as opposed to ﬁrm-speciﬁc infor-
mation. Second, we ﬁnd that the coeﬃcient of logMVE is signiﬁcantly positive across all columns, reﬂecting
that large ﬁrms have more synchronous prices. Third, we ﬁnd that synchronicity decreases signiﬁcantly with
earnings volatility (SROA). Fourth, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcantly positive coeﬃcient for CHAEBOL, suggesting that
stock prices are more synchronous for chaebol-aﬃliated ﬁrms. Finally, contrary to our expectations, we ﬁnd
that synchronicity is higher for ﬁrms who appoint Big 4-aﬃliated auditors than for those with non-Big 4-aﬃl-
iated auditors.5.3. Does the level of institutional holdings matter?
Previous research uses the level of institutional holdings as a proxy for institutions’ information advantage
when examining the informational role of institutions (e.g., Jiambalvo et al., 2002; Yan and Zhang, 2009). On
one hand, higher shareholdings may enable institutional investors to gain access to ﬁrm-speciﬁc private infor-
mation. This suggests that the level of institutional holdings is inversely related to synchronicity. On the other
hand, institutions that follow index investment strategies or section-based strategies are more likely to have an
information advantage with respect to industry- or market-level information, which contributes to improving
intra-industry information transfers. This view suggests a positive relation between institutional holdings and
synchronicity. To see whether our results reported in Table 5 are driven by the omission of the institutional
holding variables, we re-estimate our main regression in Eq. (3) after adding the levels of foreign and domestic
institutional holdings at the end of year t  1 to the trading intensity measures.15
Though not reported here for brevity, our re-estimated results show that the inclusion of the level-of-hold-
ing (as opposed to trading) variables does not alter our main inferences on the test variables, FORV, DOMV,
STDV and LTDV. That is, (i) trading by both foreign and domestic institutions facilitates the incorporation of
ﬁrm-speciﬁc information into stock prices, thereby reducing stock price synchronicity or co-movement; (2)
trading by foreign investors decreases synchronicity to a greater extent than trading by domestic institutions;
and (3) trading by domestic short-term institutions decreases synchronicity, but trading by domestic long-term
institutions does not. We also ﬁnd that the levels of shareholdings of foreign and domestic institutional inves-
tors are insigniﬁcant in inﬂuencing synchronicity. In short, the above ﬁndings, taken together, suggest that it is
institutional trading and not institutional holding, which facilitates the incorporation of ﬁrm-speciﬁc informa-
tion into stock prices.5.4. Change analysis
Although the above analysis controls for many ﬁrm characteristics that might account for the relationship
between synchronicity and institutional trading, there is an endogeneity concern with respect to omitted15 Since in 2004 the FSS stopped requiring the reporting of ownership stakes by diﬀerent types of investors in Business Reports,
equivalent to U.S. 10-K reports, our analysis is limited to the period 1998–2003.
Table 6
Change analysis.
Variable Dependent variable = Synch
Coeﬀ. t-Stat.
DFORV 0.443 1.88c
DSTDV 0.616 2.45b
DLTDV 0.221 0.47
Dlog(1 + #ANAL) 0.060 1.36
DlogMVE 0.116 2.86a
DLEV 0.325 1.23
DMB 0.000 3.40a
DSROA 0.681 1.29
DHERFIN 2.369 2.35b
DCHAEBOL 0.037 0.29
DGDR 0.229 0.47
DBIG4 0.119 2.22b
DAveVol 4.966 4.23a
Intercept 0.002 0.08
Industry dummy Yes
Adjusted R2 0.058
N 3723
The superscripts a, b and c denote the 1%, 5% and 10% levels of signiﬁcance, respectively,
using a two-tailed test. All variables are deﬁned in Appendix B. Reported t-values are on an
adjusted basis using standard errors corrected for clustering by ﬁrm and by year.
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analysis using the model16 See
(2008)DSynchjt ¼ b0 þ b1DFORV jt þ b2DSTDV jt þ b3DLTDV jt þ b4D log ð1þ#ANALÞjt þ b5D logMVEjt
þ b6DLEV jt þ b7DMBjt þ b8DSROAjt þ b9DHERFINjt þ b10DCHAEBOLjt þ b11DGDRjt
þ b12DBIG4jt þ b13DAveVoljt þ ðIndustryDummiesÞ þ error ð4Þwhere all variables starting with D represent changes in the variables from year t  1 to year t and the vari-
ables are as deﬁned earlier.
Table 6 presents the results for the above change-based regression, using a reduced sample of 3723
observations. We ﬁnd that the coeﬃcients of DFORV and DSTDV are both signiﬁcantly negative, while the
coeﬃcient of DLTDV is insigniﬁcantly positive, which is consistent with the ﬁndings of the level-based tests
(as reported in Table 5). Overall, the results of our change-based regressions suggest that an increase in the
trading activities of foreign and short-term domestic investors leads to a decrease in stock price synchronicity,
while the trading activities of domestic long-term institutions are not associated with synchronicity. This ﬁnd-
ing provides additional assurance that our level-based regression results reported in Table 5 are unlikely to be
driven by correlated omitted variables or reverse causality.
6. Results using an alternative measure of ﬁrm-speciﬁc information ﬂows
Since Roll (1988), a growing body of research in the ﬁnance literature16 has provided evidence that higher
synchronicity means a smaller amount of ﬁrm-speciﬁc information capitalized into stock prices. Put diﬀer-
ently, the lower the level of stock price synchronicity, the greater the relative amount of ﬁrm-speciﬁc informa-
tion being incorporated into stock prices. For the purpose of our study, an inverse relation between the, for example, Morck et al. (2000), Jin and Myers (2006), Chen et al. (2007), Ferreira and Laux (2007), Fernandes and Ferreira
, Hutton et al. (2009) and Gul et al. (2010).
16 J.-B. Kim, C.H. Yi /China Journal of Accounting Research 8 (2015) 1–23intensity of (foreign and domestic) institutional trading and our synchronicity measure can be viewed as an
indication that institutional trading facilitates the ﬂow of ﬁrm-speciﬁc information to the market and its incor-
poration into stock prices, thereby reducing synchronicity. Admittedly, however, this information-based inter-
pretation of synchronicity is not without controversy.17 Noise trading and limits to arbitrage may be
responsible for an increase in return volatility. For example, one can argue that institutional trading adds
noise in stock returns and thus increases idiosyncratic volatility in stock returns, or decreases synchronicity,
which in turn leads to an inverse relation between institutional trading and synchronicity. To further substan-
tiate the hypothesized (inverse) relation between institutional trading and stock price synchronicity, we also
consider an alternative measure of synchronicity that focuses on the ﬂow of ﬁrm-speciﬁc private information
ﬂows to the market. For this purpose, we ﬁrst obtain the annual measure of the probability of informed trad-
ing (PIN). Appendix A describes how the PIN measure is calculated. We then re-estimate our main regression
in Eq. (3) with PIN as the dependent variable in lieu of Synch.18
As mentioned earlier, institutional investors are elite information processors capable of transforming public
information into value-relevant private information. These institutional investors may also have an advantage
over individual investors in gaining access to and gathering and processing ﬁrm-speciﬁc private information.
Therefore, institutional investors are more likely to make their trading decisions based on ﬁrm-speciﬁc private
information than individual investors. As institutional trading becomes more intense, a ﬁrm’s shares are more
likely to be traded by informed traders, which in turn leads to a higher probability of informed trading. We
therefore predict a positive relation between the intensity of institutional trading and our proxy for the ﬂow of
ﬁrm-speciﬁc private information to the market, namely, PIN. As explained in Appendix A, the PIN measure is
developed from a structural market microstructure model and captures the relative amount of ﬁrm-speciﬁc
private information incorporated into stock prices via information-based trading.19
In estimating our main regressions using PIN as the dependent variable in lieu of Synch, we keep the same
set of control variables as before, because our objective here is not to investigate cross-sectional determinants
of private information-based trading activities but, rather, to see whether our main results are robust to the
alternative measure of ﬁrm-speciﬁc information ﬂow. We re-estimate our main regressions in Table 5 with PIN
as the dependent variable and present the new results in Table 7. As shown in Table 7, the coeﬃcients of
FORV and STDV are 0.037 with t = 2.73 and 0.075 with t = 4.39, respectively. This suggests that trading
by foreign investors and domestic short-term institutions increases the relative amount of ﬁrm-speciﬁc private
information capitalized into stock prices as reﬂected in our PIN measure. We ﬁnd, however, that PIN is not
signiﬁcantly associated with trading by domestic long-term institutions (LTDV). We also ﬁnd that trading by
domestic short-term institutions has a larger impact on PIN than trading by foreign investors (p < 0.01,
one-tailed test). To the extent that a higher PIN is associated with lower Synch or higher ﬁrm-speciﬁc return
variation, the signiﬁcant positive relations of PIN with FORV and STDV, and the insigniﬁcant relation
between Synch and LTDV are in line with our earlier results reported in Table 5. The above results corrob-
orate the view that our Synch measure correctly captures the amount of ﬁrm-speciﬁc information capitalized
into stock prices via information-based trading.
Overall, the results reported in Table 7 corroborate our earlier ﬁnding that trading by foreign investors and
domestic short-term institutions facilitates the capitalization of ﬁrm-speciﬁc information into stock prices via
information-based trading, while trading by domestic long-term institutions does not.7. Institutional trading and the mispricing of accruals
Thus far, our evidence consistently indicates that foreign investors and domestic short-term institutions
facilitate the incorporation of ﬁrm-speciﬁc information into stock prices via their trading activities, while17 A few (unpublished) studies raise questions about this information-based interpretation of synchronicity and provide evidence
suggesting that synchronicity may reﬂect noises in stock returns that are not related to ﬁrm-speciﬁc information (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al.,
2006; Teoh et al., 2008). As in many other studies, our tests are predicated upon the information-based interpretation of synchronicity,
given that evidence supporting this interpretation is overwhelming and growing in the contemporary ﬁnance (and accounting) literature.
18 Analysis using the PIN measure has fewer observations (2933 ﬁrm–year observations) due to data limitations.
19 We thank Woo-Jong Lee for his assistance in obtaining the data required for computing PIN.
Table 7
Results of simultaneous estimations of the relations between foreign and domestic institutional
trading and PIN, a measure of the probability of informed trading.
Variable Dependent variable = PIN
Coeﬀ. t-Stat.
FORV 0.037 2.73a
STDV 0.075 4.39a
LTDV 0.039 1.63
log(1 + #ANAL) 0.008 4.36a
logMVE 0.013 11.75a
LEV 0.025 4.15a
MB 0.000 9.83a
SROA 0.048 3.59a
HERFIN 0.013 1.14
CHAEBOL 0.001 0.01
GDR 0.006 0.88
BIG4 0.001 0.89
AveVol 0.087 2.83a
Intercept 0.475 22.14a
Industry dummy Yes
Adjusted R2 0.192
N 2933
The superscripts a, b and c denote the 1%, 5% and 10% levels of signiﬁcance, respectively, using
a two-tailed test. All variables are deﬁned in Appendix B. Reported t-values are on an adjusted
basis using standard errors corrected for clustering by ﬁrm and by year.
J.-B. Kim, C.H. Yi / China Journal of Accounting Research 8 (2015) 1–23 17domestic long-term institutions do not. As an additional validity check, our analysis below focuses on whether
and how trading activities by three diﬀerent types of institutional investors—foreign, domestic short-term and
domestic long-term institutions—diﬀerentially aﬀect the pricing eﬃciency of accounting accruals. Our analysis
is motivated by Sloan (1996), who ﬁnds a negative relation between the accrual component of current earnings
and future stock returns. His ﬁnding, which is often referred to as an “accrual anomaly,” suggests that the
market price does not fully reﬂect the accrual component of earnings being less persistent than the cash ﬂow
component of earnings. His analysis further demonstrates that a hedge trading strategy of buying stocks with
low accruals and selling stocks with high accruals yields signiﬁcant abnormal returns in the year following
portfolio formation.
Drawing on Sloan’s (1996) ﬁndings, one can argue that sophisticated institutional investors with superior
ability to analyze and interpret published annual ﬁnancial reports should be better able to understand the dif-
ferential persistence of the two earnings components, accruals and cash ﬂows, and that their trading activities
facilitate the impounding of these two earnings components into stock prices. Given our ﬁnding that foreign
and domestic short-term institutional investors contribute more to the incorporation of ﬁrm-speciﬁc informa-
tion into stock prices via their trading activities than domestic long-term institutions, we predict that a trading
strategy that exploits the mispricing of the accrual component of earnings should be less proﬁtable for ﬁrms
whose shares are more intensely traded by foreign and domestic short-term institutional investors.
To test the above prediction, we ﬁrst compute the accrual component of annual earnings as follows:Accrualsj;t ¼ Earningsj;t  CFOj;t ð5Þwhere, for ﬁrm j and year t, Earnings is earnings from continuing operations standardized by average total
assets and CFO is cash ﬂow from operations divided by average total assets. Similar to Sloan (1996), we then
compute one-year-ahead size-adjusted returns as a proxy for future abnormal returns. One-year-ahead size-
adjusted returns are the diﬀerence between a ﬁrm’s annual buy-and-hold return and the average annual buy-
and-hold return of the size decile portfolio to which the ﬁrm belongs. To calculate the return to the size decile
portfolios, all ﬁrms are assigned to size deciles based on their market value of equity at the beginning of the year
in which the return accumulation period begins. The decile portfolio return is the value-weighted return of all
18 J.-B. Kim, C.H. Yi /China Journal of Accounting Research 8 (2015) 1–23ﬁrms that belong to the size decile portfolio. Annual size-adjusted (buy-and-hold) returns for each size decile
portfolio are computed for the 12-month period starting four months after the end of the ﬁscal year.
To evaluate the proﬁtability of our accrual-based trading strategy, we assign ﬁrms into deciles at the begin-
ning of each ﬁscal year based on the magnitude of accruals and then group them into three portfolios: the
lowest (deciles 1 and 2), the middle (deciles 3 through 8) and the highest (deciles 9 and 10). We then calculate
future abnormal returns for each portfolio for the year after portfolio construction. Panel A of Table 8 reports
the results for the full sample, while Panels B, C and D report the results for the subsamples partitioned by the
intensity of institutional trading by foreign, domestic short-term and domestic long-term institutional inves-
tors, respectively.
As presented in Panel A of Table 8, we ﬁnd that, consistent with Sloan (1996), one-year-ahead abnormal
returns (i.e., size-adjusted returns) to accrual-based decile portfolios decrease monotonically as we move from
low-accrual portfolios (deciles 1 and 2) to high-accrual portfolios (deciles 9 and 10). When we form a hedge
portfolio with a long position in the low-accrual portfolio (deciles 1 and 2) and a short position in the high-
accrual portfolio (deciles 9 and 10), the return to this hedge portfolio is 15.9%, which is signiﬁcant both sta-
tistically (t = 4.76) and economically.
In Panel B of Table 8, we assess the impact of foreign investors’ trading activities on the pricing of accruals.
For this purpose, we ﬁrst partition our full sample into two subsamples: one with high FORV (above-median
FORV) and the other with low FORV (below-median FORV). As shown in Panel B of Table 8, we ﬁnd that
one-year-ahead abnormal returns are also negatively related to accruals for both subsamples. More impor-
tantly, we ﬁnd that the return to the hedge portfolio is smaller for the high-FORV subsample (0.092) than
for the low-FORV subsample (0.225), and this return diﬀerence between the two subsamples is signiﬁcant
at the 10% level (t = 1.82), as indicated in the last column of the same panel. The above results are in line with
the view that foreign investors understand the implication of accruals for future returns and their trading
activities reduce the mispricing of accruals.
In Panel C of Table 8, we partition our full sample into two subsamples using the trading intensity of short-
term domestic institutions: one with high STDV and the other with low STDV. As seen in Panel C of Table 8,
we ﬁnd that one-year-ahead abnormal returns decrease with the magnitude of accruals for both subsamples.
Moreover, we ﬁnd that the return to the hedge portfolio is smaller for the high-STDV subsample (0.073) than
for the low-STDV subsample (0.253). This return diﬀerence is signiﬁcant at the 1% level (t = 2.77). The
above results are consistent with the view that domestic short-term institutions facilitate the incorporation
of ﬁrm-speciﬁc information into stock prices via their trading activities, leading us to observe the one-year-
ahead return to the hedge portfolio is lower for the high-STDV subsample than for the low-STDV subsample.
Panel D of Table 8 reports the results for the two subsamples of ﬁrms with high LTDV and low LTDV.
Similar to the results reported in both Panels B and C of Table 8, the results in Panel D show that one-
year-ahead abnormal returns decrease with the magnitude of accruals for both high-LTDV and low-LTDV
subsamples. We ﬁnd, however, that the return to the hedge portfolio does not diﬀer signiﬁcantly between
the high-LTDV subsample (0.127) and the low-LTDV subsample (0.190). This ﬁnding is in line with our earlier
ﬁndings that, unlike foreign and short-term domestic institutions, the trading activities of domestic long-term
institutions do not necessarily facilitate the incorporation of ﬁrm-speciﬁc information into stock prices via
their trading activities.
We next conduct a regression analysis to further examine the relation between the accrual component of
earnings and future stock returns after controlling for other variables that are deemed to aﬀect future stock
returns. Speciﬁcally, we estimate the regression modelSARj;tþ1 ¼ a0 þ a1ACCdecj;t þ a2Sizej;t þ a3 logBMj;t þ a4EPj;t þ a5FORV Hj;t þ a6STDV Hj;t
þ a7LTDV Hj;t þ a8ACCdecj;t  FORV Hj;t þ a8ACCdecj;t  STDV Hj;t þ a8ACCdecj;t  LTDV Hj;t
þ ðindustrydummiesÞ þ error ð6Þwhere, for ﬁrm j and year t (or t + 1), SARj;tþ1 is the one-year-ahead size-adjusted return; ACC
dec
j;t is the decile
rank of an accrual-based decile portfolio, scaled to range from zero to one; Sizej;t is the natural log of the year-
end market capitalization; logBMj;t is the natural log of the ratio of the book value of common equity to the
Table 8
Institutional trading and the mispricing of accruals.
Accrual-based decile portfolio Mean t-Statistics
Panel A: Hedge portfolio test for the full sample
Deciles 1 and 2 0.046 1.68c
Deciles 3–8 0.009 0.68
Deciles 9 and 10 0.113 5.87a
Return to the hedge portfolio 0.159 4.76a
Accrual-based decile portfolio High FORV Low FORV Diﬀerence
Mean t-Stat. Mean t-Stat. t-Stat.
Panel B: Hedge portfolio test for high FORV versus low FORV
Deciles 1 and 2 0.025 0.69 0.063 0.025 0.69
Deciles 3–8 0.015 0.83 0.036 0.015 0.83
Decile 9 and 10 0.067 2.59a 0.162 0.067 2.59a
Return to the hedge portfolio 0.092 1.82c 0.225 0.092 1.82c
Accrual-based decile portfolio High STDV Low STDV Diﬀerence
Mean t-Stat. Mean t-Stat. t-Stat.
Panel C: Hedge portfolio test for high STDV versus low STDV
Deciles 1 and 2 0.044 1.17 0.047 1.21 0.26
Deciles 3–8 0.004 0.23 0.024 1.08 0.34
Deciles 9 and 10 0.029 1.08 0.206 7.93a 4.69a
Return to the hedge portfolio 0.073 1.70c 0.253 5.40a 2.77a
Accrual-based decile portfolio High LTDV Low LTDV Diﬀerence
Mean t-Stat. Mean t-Stat. t-Stat.
Panel D: Hedge portfolio test for high LTDV versus low LTDV
Deciles 1 and 2 0.038 0.96 0.051 1.37 1.03
Deciles 3–8 0.010 0.56 0.031 1.40 0.83
Deciles 9 and 10 0.089 3.41a 0.139 4.91*** 1.65c
Return to the hedge portfolio 0.127 3.15a 0.190 3.63*** 0.28
(1) (2)
Coeﬃcient t-Value Coeﬃcient t-Value
Panel E: Cross-sectional regressions of stock returns on accruals and other predictors of returns
ACCdec 0.141 3.75a 0.398 3.50a
SIZE 0.034 4.50a 0.032 3.13b
logBM 0.270 5.88a 0.253 5.91a
EP 0.013 0.51 0.023 0.81
FORV_H 0.136 1.09
STDV_H 0.082 1.30
LTDV_H 0.014 0.22
ACCdec * FORV_H 0.207 2.01c
ACCdec * STDV_H 0.230 2.68b
ACCdec * LTDV_H 0.062 0.56
Intercept 0.871 5.95a 0.727 3.54a
Industry dummy Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.071 0.104
The superscripts a, b and c denote the 1%, 5% and 10% levels of signiﬁcance, respectively, using a two-tailed test. All variables are deﬁned
in Appendix B. Each reported coeﬃcient represents the average of estimated coeﬃcients from ten annual regressions. Each reported t-
value is computed using the empirical distribution of ten annual coeﬃcients (after correcting for serial correlation).
J.-B. Kim, C.H. Yi / China Journal of Accounting Research 8 (2015) 1–23 19market value of common equity; EPj;t is the ratio of earnings per share divided by the ﬁscal year-end stock
price; FORV Hj;t is an indicator variable that equals one if FORV is higher than its median, and zero other-
wise; and STDV Hj;t (LTDV Hj;t) is an indicator variable that equals one if STDV (LTDV) is higher than its
median, and zero otherwise.
20 J.-B. Kim, C.H. Yi /China Journal of Accounting Research 8 (2015) 1–23Panel E of Table 8 reports the results of the Fama–MacBeth (1973) regression in Eq. (6).20 Column 1
reports the result of a baseline regression without including institutional trading variables and their interac-
tions with ACCdec. The coeﬃcient of ACCdec is signiﬁcantly negative, which is consistent with the results
reported in Panel A of Table 8.21 Column 2 of Panel E presents the result of the full-model regression in
Eq. (6): We ﬁnd that the coeﬃcients of ACCdec * FORV_H and ACCdec * STDV_H are signiﬁcantly positive,
while the coeﬃcient of ACCdec * LTDV_H is insigniﬁcant. These results are consistent with those reported in
Panels B to D of Table 8, suggesting that the mispricing of accruals is mitigated for such ﬁrms whose shares
are traded more intensely by foreign and domestic short-term institutions, while it is not aﬀected by trading by
domestic long-term institutions. In short, the results reported in Table 8, taken together, imply that trading by
foreign investors and domestic short-term institutions mitigates the mispricing of accruals by facilitating the
incorporation of ﬁrm-speciﬁc information into stock prices.8. Summary and concluding remarks
Using a large sample of ﬁrms listed on the KSE over 1998–2007, this paper investigates whether and how
trading by foreign and domestic institutional investors impacts the incorporation of ﬁrm-speciﬁc information
into stock prices, captured by stock price synchronicity. Our results reveal the following. First, stock price syn-
chronicity decreases signiﬁcantly with the intensity of trading by foreign investors and domestic institutions.
Second, among domestic institutions with diﬀering investment horizons, short-term institutions such as secu-
rities and investment trust companies play a more important role in facilitating ﬁrm-speciﬁc information ﬂow
to the market via their trading activities than long-term institutions such as banks and insurance companies.
Third, we show that trading by foreign investors and domestic short-term institutions facilitates ﬁrm-speciﬁc
information ﬂow to a greater extent than trading by long-term domestic institutions. Fourth, the above ﬁnd-
ings are robust to potential endogeneity biases and an alternative measure of ﬁrm-speciﬁc information ﬂow.
We also ﬁnd that it is institutional trading, and not institutional shareholdings, which facilitates the incorpo-
ration of ﬁrm-speciﬁc information into stock prices. Finally, we provide further evidence that the trading
activities of foreign and domestic short-term institutions reduce accrual mispricing, while those of domestic
long-term institutions do not.
Overall, our results are consistent with the view that foreign and domestic short-term institutions in emerg-
ing markets are more actively involved in information-based trading than domestic long-term institutions,
and, thus, that the trading activities of the former facilitate the incorporation of ﬁrm-speciﬁc information into
stock prices to a greater extent than the trading activities of the latter. However, since our analyses are
performed in an emerging economy where ﬁrm ownership is typically concentrated in the hands of a few
controlling shareholders and large business groups play a dominant role, we caution against generalizing
our results to other developed economies with diﬀuse ownership and strong corporate governance. Given
the scarcity of empirical evidence on the informational role of shareholdings and trading by foreign
institutions vis-a`-vis domestic institutions, we recommend further research on the economic consequences
of foreign versus domestic institutional trading in other contexts, including the eﬀect on the cost of capital,
ﬁrm valuation and the eﬃciency of capital allocation and investment in emerging markets.Acknowledgments
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Appendix A. Alternative measure of ﬁrm-speciﬁc information ﬂow
We use the probability of informed trading (PIN) developed by Easley et al. (2002) as an alternative
dependent variable in our study. The variable PIN is measured using a structural market microstructure
model where trade comes from either informed or uninformed traders. On a day with no information
events, uninformed buyers and uninformed sellers arrive at the rates of eb and es, respectively. Information
events occur with probability a. Information events are either good news with probability (1  d), or bad
news with probability d. Let l denote the arrival rate of informed traders when an information event occurs.
Informed traders will buy when they observe good news and will sell upon observing bad news. Thus, on
bad event days, the arrival rate of buy orders is eb and the arrival rate of sell orders is es + l. On good event
days, the arrival rate of buy orders is eb + l and the arrival rate of sell orders is es. Easley et al. (2002) show
that, under certain conditions, PIN for a stock in a given period is measured asPIN ¼ al
alþ es þ eb ða1Þwhere al is the arrival rate for information-based orders and al + es + eb is the arrival rate of all orders. The
variable PIN measures the probability of information-based trading by informed traders. To obtain the
annual PIN measure for each ﬁrm in our sample, transaction data are retrieved from the Trade and Quote
database provided by the Institute of Finance and Banking (IFB) of Seoul National University (IFB/KSE
database). The IFB-KSE database has each order time-stamped with the time it arrived at the exchange
and the time the order was executed, which allows us to identify whether a speciﬁc order was initiated by a
buyer or a seller. Based on the number of daily buys and sells for each trading day, we obtain h = (l, eb,
es, a, d) to maximize the likelihood function for the total number of buys and sells on a single day, for each
stock in each year. We then compute yearly PIN measures for each stock using the formula in Eq. (a1).
Appendix B. Variable deﬁnitionsVariable DeﬁnitionPanel A: Stock price synchronicity
R2 = coeﬃcient of determination from the estimation of the ﬁrm–year estimation of the
model in Eq. (1)
Synch = stock price synchronicity measured by log[R2/(1  R2)]
Panel B: Probability of informed trading measure
PIN = annual probability of information-based trading measure of Easley et al. (2002)Panel C: Variables of interest used in main regressions
FORV = sum of total shares purchased and sold by non-resident foreign investors as a fraction
of annual trading volume
DOMV = sum of total shares purchased and sold by domestic institutional investors as a fraction
of annual trading volume (DOMV = STDV + LTDV)
STDV = sum of total shares purchased and sold by domestic securities and investment trust
companies as a fraction of annual trading volume
LTDV = sum of total shares purchased and sold by domestic insurance companies and banks as
a fraction of annual trading volumePanel D: Control variables
log(1 + #ANAL) = log(1 + number of analysts following)
logMVE = log of market capitalization
22 J.-B. Kim, C.H. Yi /China Journal of Accounting Research 8 (2015) 1–23LEV = total debt/total asset
MB = market value of equity/book value of equity
SROA = standard deviation of ROA measured over the past ﬁve years using 10 half-yearly
observations
HERFIN = sales revenue-based Herﬁndahl index of industry-level concentration
CHAEBOL = 1 if a ﬁrm belongs to one of the 30 largest chaebols, and 0 otherwise
GDR = 1 if a ﬁrm is cross-listed, and 0 otherwise
BIG4 = 1 if a local auditor is a member of a Big 4 ﬁrm, and 0 otherwise
AveVol = average daily trading volume/shares outstandingReferences
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